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THE ROLE OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
ESTATE PLANNING t
HAROLD G. WREN *
L iFn insurance plays an uncommonly significant role in
every estate plan. In smaller estates, it may make up
the largest single asset, and almost invariably, the most liquid.
In larger estates, life insurance is used to accomplish specific
planning objectives not otherwise attainable. This article
has as its objective a review of the uses of life insurance in
typical estate plans.
In planning the life insurance program of the client,
one should adhere to the following basic prpcedure:
1. Analyze his present insurance position.
2. Determine and suggest alternatives to rationalize
his insurance program.
3. Analyze his object and the extent to which
different plans may be used to accomplish them.
4. Determine the net cost of the plans considered.
5. Present an overall optimum plan, based on a balanc-
ing of insurance costs with the satisfaction of the client's
objectives.
ANALYZING THE CLIENT'S PRESENT POSITION
The estate planner begins his study by preparing a
schedule of the client's life insurance policies. The schedule
shows the type of policy, the premium, the proceeds, the
t This article is based on a chapter which will appear in the book
ESTATE PLANNING, by Harold G. Wren, to be published and copy-
righted by The Ronald Press Company. All Rights Reserved.
* A.B. 1942, LL.B. 1948, Columbia University; J.S.D. 1957, Yale Law
School; Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
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beneficiary, etc. At this point, a host of questions should
be answered in connection with the client's policies:
1. What are the face amounts?
2. What are the kinds of policies, e.g., ordinary life,
term, endowment, etc.?
3. Are the funds available for premiums being expended
to the best advantage?
4. Are the companies satisfactory?
5. Should the ownership of the policies be changed?
6. Does the disposition qualify for the marital deduc-
tion if separate property is involved?
7. Will any life insurance be paid to a minor so as to
require a guardianship? If so, what arrangements have been
made to designate the guardian?
8. Does any portion of the insurance fall within the
"transfer for value" rule?'
9. Is any life insurance subject to debt? If so, to
whom is the debt owed? Will the estate plan be distorted
if the debt is paid out of other assets?
10. Is any of the insurance payable to the estate of
the insured, so as to make it subject to creditors' claims?
Conversely, should consideration be given to making the
insurance payable to the insured's estate to promote flexi-
bility within the estate?
11. What arrangements have been made to insure that
premiums will continue to be paid?
12. Will non-payment of premiums result in cancella-
tion, a paid-up term policy, or some other optional settlement?
13. Are there any double indemnity or similar features?
14. Is there a waiver of premiums in the event of dis-
ability? Must it be claimed to be available?
IINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2). Such a transfer for value may
occur inadvertently, e.g., where the insured transfers a policy (perhaps to his
wholly owned corporation) on which he has borrowed money to pay premiums,
and the transferee assumes the liability of the insured on the policy.
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These are only some of the questions that must be
answered to determine the effectiveness of the client's present
insurance program.
RATIONALIZING THD CLIBNT'S INSURANCE PROGRAM
After the planner has had an opportunity to study the
client's present program, he turns to a consideration of all
those things necessary to improve the insurance picture.
Rarely will the client's insurance house be completely in
order. He may be underinsured; he may have purchased
the wrong types of policies; he may have designated the
wrong beneficiaries; or he may not have integrated his
insurance program into the other aspects of his over-all estate
plan.
After tentatively deciding on the steps necessary to
improye the client's program, the planner arranges for an
interview, at which time he introduces the client to various
insurance alternatives, pointing out the advantages and
disadvantages of each. To be successful at this interview,
the planner must have three areas of knowledge at his finger-
tips: (A) the kinds of policies; (B) the methods of pay-
ment; and (C) the tax advantages of each.
THE KINDS OF POLICIES
Ordinary Life Insurance
Not infrequently, the client will say that he would
rather buy term insurance and use the difference between
the cost of term and ordinary life for investment purposes.
What are the insured's chances of making more by this
method than by the purchase of whole life insurance?
The fact is that his chances are quite remote. This is
because the interest component of ordinary life insurance is
taxed neither to the insured when it is earned nor to the
beneficiary when it is paid. Consider the following, quoted
frokm Fortune:
The. chart at the left [omitted] shows the cumulative cost of two
$10,000 policies to an individual who is thirty-five when they are
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first taken out. On the whole-life policy he pays a total of $4,758
in premiums, but this cost can be reduced by $1,410 if he lets his
dividends accumulate, leaving a net cost of $3,348. On the term
policy, the net premium cost is $1,146-a difference of $2,203, or
about $111 a year. The chart at right [omitted] shows that the
individual who pays the extra premium will have $3,898 (in cash
surrender value) at the end of twenty years, and there is virtually
no tax on this. To accumulate the same amount by investing $111
a year during that period, he would have to earn 5.1 per cent on his
money, and any such earnings would be fully taxed either as divi-
dends or as capital gains. Even if he could count on earning an
average of 8 per cent, all in the form of capital gains, he would be
only a little better off than with whole life. An 8 per cent return
on $111 a year would give him $5,600 after twenty years, but for
anyone in the 50 per cent (or higher) tax bracket the capital gains
tax would reduce this amount to $4,760.2
Ordinary life insurance has the additional advantage that
once the policy has been issued, it is never again necessary
for the insured to take a physical examination. On retire-
ment, if the insured finds that he has acquired enough assets
so that the death-risk provided by the policy is no longer
required, he may cash in the policy, or convert it to some
other type of insurance, such as an annuity, or take a paid-up
policy which requires no further premium payments.
Term Insurance
Term insurance is pure death-risk insurance, and the
term insurance contract will do this particular job better
than any other type of insurance contract-provided the
insured dies while the policy is in force. One difficulty with
term insurance is that many such policies must be renewed
after a term of years at a higher premium. Some policies
require a new physical examination before renewal. This is,
of course, a real danger. While each of us thinks of himself
as one who will continue to stay in good health, any thought-
ful person will concede that it is very easy to become
uninsurable.
2 The Case Against the Case for Term Insurance, Fortune, Sept 1963,
p. 230.
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tTerm isuranwe -- ay serve a ery nieful -function for
some purposes. ,One -of these -is :mortgage insurance, which
t6es the form of "decreasing term." In contrast with the
usual term, where the amount of the proceeds remains level
while the premiums are periodically stepped up, in mortgage
insurance the -premium remains level, and. the amount of the
proceeds is stepped down over the term of the insurance.
The term coincides with the duration of the mortgage, and
the proceeds coincide with the balance due on the mortgage
as of the date of the death ofthe insured. -
Mortgage insurance makes partcularly good sense for
the typical breacwiner who buys his home by means of
making payments which pay the interest due on the loan
and also reduce the balance due on the principal of the
mortgage. In the event of the insured's death, his widow
receives a home that is fully paid for.
The principle of decreasing proceeds may also be .used
in conjunction with whole life insurance. Let us hypothesize
a young executive, aged 42, who presently earns $20,000 a
year. His wife is age 38, and he has three children, ages 15,
14 and 8. The family owns its own home in typical Upper
Middle Class Suburbia. For $1,000 per year, our executive
can obtain instant coverage of $92,000 from a good life
insurance company. This figure will gradually decline over
the next 15 years, to a permanent coverage of $23,000. By
this time, the children will be on their. own, and other assets
in his estate will have increased in value to offset the decline
in life insurance proceeds. The important thing is that his
family will have obtained protection against his untimely
death. Without such protection, it would be extremely diffi-
cult for his family to continue to live in the style to which
they are accustomed.
Limited Pay Policies
Limited pay insurance is a form of life insurance wherein
the client pays premiums for a number of years, after which
the policy is said to be "paid-up." Typically, limited pay
policies are written -for 5, 10, 15 or 20 years, and a- paid
up at age 65. The- advantage is that premiums have to be
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paid for a limited time only. At the end of the specified
time, no further premiums are due, and the insurance
continues in force. To accomplish this, the insurance com-
pany merely accelerates the premiums. Ordinary life is really
a limited pay contract, but it is not paid up until age 100.
Premiums for limited pay insurance are higher than for
ordinary life for the same amount of coverage, and the cash
values and paid-up values accumulate faster.
Why are these policies issued? Simply because many
people wish to look forward to the time when no further
premiums will become due, and they are willing to pay an
extra amount to achieve this objective. These policies are
ideal for people who have high earning power for a relatively
short period of time, such as athletes and entertainers. There
may also be some minor tax advantages, which we shall con-
sider later.3 Sometimes -when the planner makes an analysis
of the insurance arrangements of the typical family man, he
may find some limited pay policies included in the insured's
program by virtue of previous planning. The planner may
recommend a rearrangement of the client's over-all insurance
program to better accomplish his estate objectives which may
have changed since the estate plan was last reviewed.
Endowment Policies
Endowment policies resemble limited pay policies in
that there is a fixed period in which premiums are paid. But
where a limited pay policy pays nothing to the insured
when he reaches the end of the limited pay period, the endow-
ment policy matures and the insured begins to receive pay-
ment under the terms of the contract.
Both limited pay and endowment policies are forms of
life insurance, i.e., they provide a measure of protection
against the risk of death, and a method of accumulating
savings. The difference between the two policies lies in the
fact that upon maturity of the endowment policy, the pro-
3 E.g., the limited pay policy may serve as a counter to the Commissioner's
contention that payment of the last three years of premiums on a policy in
which the decedent has given up all incidents of ownership constitutes a
gift in contemplation of death.
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ceeds are paid to the insured, while in the limited pay
policy, the proceeds are not paid until the insured's death.
Annuity Contracts
An annuity may be described as the opposite of life
insurance. In the case of life insurance, the insured pays a
small amount in the form of insurance premiums over a period
of years. On death, the insurance company pays a large
amount to his estate or beneficiary. In the case of the
annuity, the annuitant pays a large amount (e.g., single
premium annuity) to the insurance company at the outset,
and the company returns it in periodic installments. Arrange-
ments can be made for the repayment period to be deferred
until a later date (e.g., upon retirement), if this is desired.
Today, most annuities do not involve a large premium pay-
ment at one time. Rather, the annuitant contributes to the
cost of the annuity by paying for it over a period of time.
Where the annuity has a death benefit, should the annuitant
fail to live to maturity, the annuity acquires much the same
appearance as an endowment contract.
An annuity guarantees a certain return to the annuitant
for life, and relieves him of the burden of investment man-
agement. It also enjoys substantial tax advantages. The
principal disadvantages are: (1) the principal is consumed,
leaving nothing for one's descendants; and (2) the fixed
payments received by the annuitant are subject to erosion
of the purchasing power of the dollar through inflation.
Some attempt has been made in recent years to provide
protection against inflation through the variable annuity.
Under such a program, the annuitant buys an annuity over
a period of years. Upon maturity (e.g., age 65), the annui-
tant is paid in units of purchasing power, rather than fixed
dollars. If, at the time of maturity, there is a period of
deflation, the annuitant would receive fewer dollars, but
would be able to buy proportionately more with those he
did receive.
ThETnODS OF PAYMENT
There are four basic ways in which an insurance com-
pany may discharge its obligation under the policy upon its
[ VoL-. 41
1966 ] LIFE INSURANCE, ESTATE PLANNING 13
maturity. One of these, the optional modes of settlement,
may in itself, be divided into four parts, two of which are
very similar.
Payment Directly to the Beneficiary in a Lump Sum
The proceeds may be paid directly in one sum to the
beneficiary named in the contract. This is possibly the most
popular method, and in many instances, it may be the best
method for a particular plan. But there are at least two
disadvantages. First, the proceeds may be dissipated and
not used to protect the spouse and family of the insured as
he intended. In all probability, the dissipation would occur
because the surviving wife and children do not have the
proper training and experience for handling, managing, and
investing a large sum of capital. The fact is that only
eighteen per cent of the beneficiaries of life insurance policies
paid in a lump sum had any funds on hand after two years.
This is somewhat sobering when it is noted that proceeds
from life insurance policies are being paid to beneficiaries
by insurance companies at an annual rate of approximately
three billion dollars.
If payment directly to the beneficiary is to be used, it is
important that the planner analyze how the beneficiary will
use it. For example, it has not been uncommon for a testator
to designate his wife as the beneficiary of a policy with the
thought that she might use some of the proceeds to pay
taxes, expenses of the estate, or even his creditors. Such a
plan would make little sense, as anyone who has handled
the administration of an estate can testify. Once the wife
receives the liquid funds directly from the insurance com-
pany, she may not want to use them for such purposes,
regardless of how advantageous this might be for the whole
estate.
Payment to the Estate of the Insured
As indicated above, the principal advantage of this
method of payment is that the executor of the estate is
provided with liquid funds which may then be used for the
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payment of claims and taxes. Should the planner decide
on this method of payment, he should do so, keeping in mind
that the insurance proceeds will be subject to the claims of
creditors and includible in the gross estate for tax purposes.
Payqment to the Trustee of a Life Insurance Trust
In recent years, to obtain the greatest flexibility in the
handling of the insurance proceeds without the disadvantages
of having the proceeds payable to the estate, the life insurance
trust has become quite popular. The trust will normally
have been established during the lifetime of the insured,
and it hay be revocable or irrevocable. By using the trust
arrangement, the planner assures maximum flexibility in the
estate plan, and still avoids the expense of having the pro-
ceeds treated as part of the probate estate, as well as their
subjection to the claims of creditors.
Optional Modes of Settlement
The optional modes of settlement make up the fourth
and last method whereby insurance proceeds may be paid by
an insurance company. While the optional modes may be
useful in some estate plans, particularly where the estate is
not too large, their inherent inflexibility has caused them to
lose much of their popularity in recent years as estate plans
have become more complex. There are four basic types of
settlement options in general use; two of these four are
quite similar.
a. The interest option
The insured may elect to have the sum payable held by
the company at interest at a stipulated rate. Under this
arrangement, the interest earned by the insurance proceeds
is paid at regular intervals to the beneficiary named by the
insured. This process continues throughout the lifetime of
the beneficiary. There is often a minimum guarantee with
respect to the interest, and while the guarantee usually is
lower than the interest actually earned and paid to the
beneficiary, it is nevertheless a valuable benefit. Upon the
[ VOL. 41
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death of the beneficiary, the principal is paid to a successor
payee, named by the insured. The insured may also give
the primary beneficiary the unlimited right to withdraw all
or a portion of the principal during the beneficiary's lifetime.
As can be seen, the interest option resembles the life
estate with a remainder. As such, it has limited utility.
Moreover, even where the widow is given the power to invade
principal, there is some risk that the arrangement may fail
to qualify for the marital deduction for estate tax purposes.
b. Payments of a fied amount
There are two methods by which the insurance company
will ordinarily make payments of fixed amounts. Under one
method, the "fixed amount" option, the company pays the
proceeds at regular intervals in payments of a fixed amount
(e.g., 5100 per month) until the proceeds are exhausted.
Under the second method, the "fixed period" option, the
company pays out the proceeds over a fixed period in equal
payments. In either case, the beneficiary may live beyond
the period over which the payments are made.
c. Life income
If the life income option is selected, the insurance com-
pany will pay the proceeds to the named beneficiary in terms
of a stated and regular amount for his life. This makes
possible a guaranteed income for the life of the beneficiary.
Some contracts provide that the proceeds shall be paid during
the joint lives of more than one beneficiary, and then to the
survivor. Here again, where the widow is the primary bene-
ficiary, there may be some risk of failing to qualify for the
marital deduction.
d. The tam advantages
To complete the rationalization of the client's insurance
program, the planner must consider the tax advantages of
various choices which the client may have made or will make
with respect to various plans which already may be in effect
-or which the planner will recommend. Since the planner
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
incorporates these advantages into his preferred solution of
the client's problems, we shall consider them in conjunction
with typical client objectives, and how the planner may
achieve them at minimum tax cost.
TESTING VARIOUS PLANS TO AcHIvE THE CLIENTS
OBJECTIVES
Having analyzed the client's present insurance position,
and having rationalized his insurance program, the planner
next offers to the client various plans based upon the
insured's objectives. Since taxes are critical in determining
the optimum estate plan, we turn to a consideration of tax
consequences as they affect typical estate planning alterna-
tives.
USE OF ILFE INSURANCE TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL
EsTATB TAx
One of the principal uses of life insurance in many
estate plans is to provide liquid funds for the payment of the
federal estate tax and other claims against the estate. One
approach is to calculate the liquidity needed and, assuming
that the client is insurable, to procure additional insurance
to cover the tax obligation, remembering that the additional
insurance will be included in the client's gross estate upon
his death.
Apart from the difficulty of calculating the amount of
insurance necessary, such a plan is hardly the better part of
wisdom, since careful planning makes it possible to exclude
the insurance from the gross estate.
But note that we said careful planning. More than one
estate plan has floundered where the planner did not think
through all the tax consequences.
Proceeds Receivable by the Executor
Section 2042(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provides that "the value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property.. . to the extent of the amount receiv-
[ VOL. 41
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able by the executor as insurance under policies on the life
of the decedent .... "
The critical language in this statute is the phrase "receiv-
able by the executor." Basically, this means that if the
proceeds would be included in the decedent's probate estate,
they will also be included in his gross estate for estate tax
purposes.' So far as this part of the statute is concerned,
it is immaterial who owns the policy.
Assume, for example, that a life insurance man is about
to close a very large policy, but the client objects that the
proceeds will be included in his gross estate for federal estate
tax purposes. He tells the client not to worry since he can
exclude the proceeds by transferring the policy to his wife,
and directing in his will that the wife use the proceeds to
meet taxes, administration expenses, and claims against the
estate.
Does this sound like a good estate plan?
It may sound like one, but actually, it is quite unwise.
The Regulations provide:
It makes no difference whether or not the estate is specifically named
as the beneficiary un.der the terms of the policy. Thus, if under the
terms of an insurance policy the proceeds are receivable by another
beneficiary but are subject to an obligation, legally binding upon the
other beneficiary, to pay taxes, debts, or other charges enforceable
against the estate, then the amount of such proceeds required for
the payment in full (to the extent of the beneficiary's obligation) of
such taxes, debts, or other charges is includible in the gross estate.5
4Whether insurance is "receivable by the executor" is dependent upon
local law. Commissioner v. Jones, 62 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1932). Thus, where
local law requires that insurance proceeds be paid to next-of-kin free of
creditors' claims, proceeds are not includible as insurance receivable by the
estate. Estate of Proutt v. Commissioner, 125 F2d 591 (6th Cir. 1942)(executor required to hold proceeds in trust for wife and daughter; held not
receivable by the estate) ; Estate of Webster v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 514(5th Cir. 1941) (insurance not receivable by executor even though decedent
made policies payable to executor; insurance passed under Florida law
directly to next-of-kin or named beneficiary and not under residuary clause
of decedent's will); Estate of Benjamin F. McGrew, 46 B.T.A. 623 (1942),
nonacq., aff'd on other grounds, 135 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1943); Julia S.
Lucky, 2 B.T.A. 1268 (1925) (decedent specifically provided that insurance
should not pass under will).
GTreas. Reg. §20.2042-1(b)(1) (1966). (Emphasis added.)
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The wife might argue that she was not "legally bound"
to make these payments to the estate, but. a -wiser approach
would have been not to have used the proceeds of the policy
in this fashion in the first place.
As early as 1922, the Commissioner ruled that where
life insurance was taken out "to provide funds to meet the
estate tax and other taxes or charges which are enforceable
against the estate," the proceeds would be includible in the
decedent's gross estate.' Since that itime, the cases have
distinguished situations where the beneficiary must," from
those where he am s use the proceeds for the payment of
taxes or other claims against the estate.
Sometimes, an estate planner will fall into this error in
connection with business insurance. For example, in one
case, the decedent and his associate entered into a contract
whereby upon the death of one, the survivor would purchase
the other's stock in a certain corporation. They further
provided that the proceeds of a $200,000 policy owned by
the corporation on the life of each, payable to his estte,
should be applied to the purchase price to be paid by the
survivor for such stock. The court held that the insuranc6
6 Letter by Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Dec. 28, 1922.
7 Mathilde B. Hooper, 41 B.T.A. 114 (1940), acq. and nonacq. (amount
payable to trustee of inter vivos trust required to be used to liquidate estate
obligations held a part of decedent's gross estate); Pacific Nat'l Bank,
40 B.T.A. 128 (1939) (proceeds payable to inter vivos trustee includible to
extent of expenses of last illness and burial where decedent directed that
such expenses should be paid out of such proceeds); Estate of Waldo
Rohnert, 40 B.T.A. 1319 (1939) (decedent directed trustee of inter vivos
trust to pay all estate taxes but failed to state that insurance payable to
such trustee should not be used for this purpose; held, amount of estate
taxes includible in decedent's gross estate); Marmaduke B. Morton, 23
B.T.A. 236 (1931), -acq. (where insurance proceeds payable to trustee
were subject to payment of charges against estate, such proceeds were
includible in gross estate).
8 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 886 (8th
Cir. 1943) (insurance payable to testamentary trustee held not receivable by
the executor); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 100 F.2d
266 (1st Cir. 1938) (proceeds not includible although payable to trustee al-
though decedent created a testamentary trust in which he named same trustee
beneficiary of policy) ; Estate of Charles H. Wade, 47 B.T.A. 21 (1942),
acq. (trustee had the power but not the duty to pay charges); Louis E.
Flye, 39 B.T.A. 871 (1939), acq. and nonacq. (although trustee could use
trust funds to pay debts and taxes, it was not obligated to do so).
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proceeds which were paid to the decedent's estate were
includible in his gross estate.9
Similarly, where insurance is used as a method of paying
claims against the estate, the insurance will be includible,
although it may be offset by a claim deductible for estate
tax purposes."0
In short, if life insurance is to be excluded from the
gross estate, the planner must make certain that the proceeds
will neither be payable to the estate nor subject to the
requirement that they be used to meet estate obligations.
Proceeds Payable to Other Beneficiaries
If insurance proceeds are made payable to beneficiaries
other than the estate, they will be included in the insured's
gross estate only if he retained "incidents of ownership"
over the policy. While the precise meaning of this term is
still subject to development, it basically refers to economic
control over the policy.
How this came to be the sole test for the inclusion of
life insurance payable to other beneficiaries is a familiar
story of estate tax history. Prior to 1942, the decedent's
gross estate included the excess over $40,000 of all life
insurance proceeds receivable by all other beneficiaries as
insurance under policies "taken out by the decedent" upon
his own life. During this period, in determining whether a
policy was "taken out by the decedent," the Regulations
vacillated between saying that this was determined by
whether the decedent held the incidents of ownership, had
paid the premiums, or had done both.
Congress resolved the problem in 1942 by eliminating
the exemption of $40,000, along with the phrase "taken out
DEstate of John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938), acq.; see also
Paul Legallet, 41 B.T.A. 294 (1940) '(income tax case; cost basis to
surviving partner of interest in partnership determined by considering in-
surance in estate of first partner to die).
10 Estate of Max Reinhold, 13 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 302 (1944) (policies
assigned as collateral on loan; debts allowed as deduction; policies includible
in gross estate); Estate of Silas B. Mason, 43 B.T.A. 813 (1941), nonacq.(insurance payable to ex-wife to satisfy alimony claims includible since
proceeds of policy were used to satisfy debt of decedent, but also deductible
from value of gross estate).
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by the decedent." At the same time, it provided that insur-
ance proceeds payable to designated beneficiaries would be
included in the decedent's gross estate if he either (1) had
paid the premiums directly or indirectly, or (2) possessed
at the time of his death any of the incidents of ownership
exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any person.
The 1942 law also provided that a reversionary interest in
the insured was not an incident of ownership.
In 1954, Congress eliminated the "payment of premiums"
test and provided that a reversionary interest should be con-
sidered an incident of ownership only if its value exceeded
five per cent of the value of the policy immediately before
the death of the decedent. At the time of the enactment, a
minority of the House Ways and Means Committee said that
the new law would "virtually do away with the estate taxation
of life insurance."'"
Life insurance today provides a convenient way of
achieving liquidity in the hands of the decedent's heirs
without increasing the estate tax burden. Whether this is
done successfully or not depends upon the care exercised
in establishing the particular estate plan. 2
Careful planning requires that the life insurance policy
be assigned to a new owner, that payment for the premiums
be arranged, and that there be a clear arrangement for the
use of the proceeds. In community property jurisdictions,
there is the additional problem of whether the insurance
transferred, or the proceeds at death, are to be treated as
separate or community property.
a. Transferring the incidents of ownership
The Regulations state that incidents of ownership in-
clude "the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or
11 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. B15 (1954).
12 As a matter of practice, all too often the client is not careful enough
about completely removing himself from a position of economic control.
He may, for example, seek a loan on the policy after he has purported to
transfer it to his wife. Such an approach is most damaging, as the
Internal Revenue Service is then able to proceed against the transfer either
under the gift tax, the estate tax, or both-whichever will produce the
greatest revenue in a given situation.
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cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assign-
ment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the
insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy...."
Similarly, the term includes a power to change the beneficiary
reserved to a corporation of which the decedent is sole stock-
holder,13 as well as such a power held by a trustee under a
life insurance trust where the decedent is one of the trustees. 4
That the concept of "incidents of ownership" is broad is
illustrated by a leading case 11 in which the decedent had
been a member of the New York Stock Exchange. The
second circuit first ruled that the benefits paid out of the
Exchange's gratuity fund were proceeds of life insurance. 6
It then held that the decedent had retained incidents of
ownership with respect to this fund, since he could deprive
his beneficiaries of their interest by selling his membership,
the value of which was increased by the existence of the fund.
While the insured might attempt to dispose of individual
incidents of ownership, the only way that he could be sure of
divesting himself entirely would be to make a complete and
irrevocable assignment of all rights in the policy. A recent
case1 7 from the United States Supreme Court indicates how
one may be freed of the incidents of ownership. The decedent,
Noel, was driven to the airport by his wife ;.he was to board
an airplane for Venezuela. Just before taking off, he signed
applications for two round-trip flight insurance policies aggre-
gating $125,000, naming his wife as beneficiary. The wife
paid the premiums and Mr. Noel instructed the sales clerk
to "give them to my wife. They are hers now, I no longer
have anything to do with them." The plane crashed in the
Atlantic, killing all on board, less than three hours after
take-off.
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court
held that the proceeds constituted life insurance. In so
13 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1966).
14 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) (1966).
1s Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950).
16 The court found that the fund employed a method for shifting the risk
of death, the basic characteristic of life insurance.
17 Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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doing, it rejected the holding below that flight insurance is
really accident insurance since it covers a risk "which is
evitable and not likely to occur." Life insurance proceeds
constituted a sum which the insurer "agrees to pay.., upon
the occurrence of an inevitable event."18
The Court then rejected three arguments of the tax-
payer, all of which sought to show that the taxpayer had no
incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his death.
The arguments were: (1) Mrs. Noel had purchased the
policies and therefore owned them; (2) even if her husband
had owned the policies, he had given them to her, thereby
depriving himself of power to assign the policies or to change
the beneficiary; and (3) assuming that he still had the power
to assign the policies or change the beneficiary, this power
was illusory since he could not have exercised it between
the time of take-off and the crash of the plane. The Court's
rejection of these points turned on the fact that the husband
had not endorsed the policy to show any assignment or
change of beneficiary. The result was that the husband had
failed to make .the alleged transfer of the policy.
Noel dramatizes the care that must be exercised in the
assignment of a life insurance policy. While the cases, law,
and regulations do not distinguish between an assignment
of the policy and the irrevocable naming of a beneficiary,
Yoel indicates that the former course of action is wiser. The
best procedure is to notify the insurance company of the
assignment and change the beneficiary to conform to the
assignee.
Often the client will desire to make his wife assignee
with or without naming her as beneficiary. While such an
assignment may be convenient, it involves inherent risks.
The wife may pre-decease her husband, thereby causing the
terminal reserve value of the policy to be added to her gross
estate. Sometimes the policy will revert in whole or in part
to the insured, by virtue of provisions in her will or because
of intestacy. In a community property jurisdiction, such
interspousal transfers not infrequently present difficult legal
Is 332 F.2d 950, 952 (3d Cir. 1964). (Emphasis added.)
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questions as well as unexpected and undesirable results with
regard to both taxes and who shall benefit from the policy.
Sometimes the client may suggest that his children be
named assignees and beneficiaries of the policy. But if any
of the children are minors, a guardianship for each minor
will be necessary with the unnecessary complexity and
expense inherent in such an arrangement.
In most cases the best solution is to establish an irrevoc-
able life insurance trust. The policy is assigned to the trustee
who is named beneficiary. On the death of the insured, the
proceeds of the policy are paid to the trustee who holds them
in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument. Draft-
ing the terms of this instrument is a major (and difficult)
undertaking for the estate planner. The dispositive provi-
sions typically provide that in the event that the wife of the
insured survives him, she shall be paid the income from the
proceeds during her life, and at her death the principal shall
be distributed among the children of the insured. The
administrative provisions should include clauses allowing the
trustee to sell or buy assets, as well as to lend or borrow
money to or from the estate of the insured. Such provisions
become extremely important on the death of the insured,
when it is desired that the liquid assets created by the
insurance proceeds be placed in the estate, and the non-
liquid assets (e.g., the business of the insured) be removed
from the decedent's estate, and placed into what was formerly
the life insurance trust.
b. The life insurance trust
Assuming that the best solution to the problem of
determining the assignee-beneficiary of the policy is to use
an irrevocable life insurance trust, certain questions remain:
should the trust be funded or unfunded? If unfunded, how
are premiums to be paid? Should the payment of premiums
be coordinated with a gift program? If a gift program is
to be used, how can the 53,000 exclusion be protected?
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b (1). The funded life insurance trust
A funded life insurance trust is one in which the grantor
transfers property to a trustee with instructions to use the
income from the trust property to purchase insurance on
the life of the insured. If the insurance is to be purchased
on the grantor's own life, the trust income is taxed to the
grantor.19 The result is that the funded insurance trust
provides no income tax saving although the grantor is
deprived of the use of the trust income. In a few instances,
the funded insurance trust may be desirable where the insur-
ance is to be purchased on the life of someone other than
the grantor. A grandfather might establish such a trust
and give the trustee discretion to purchase insurance on the
life of a son or son-in-law who is the father of the settlor's
grandchildren. If the father is young, such an investment by
the trustee might constitute a profitable investment for the
trust.2 At the same time, the grandchildren are protected
against the untimely death of their father.
A wife having separate property may establish an irre-
vocable funded life insurance trust in which she would pro-
vide that the trustee could purchase life insurance on the
life of her husband. Again, such a trust is particularly useful
in protecting the children of the grantor and the insured.
b (2). The unfunded life insurance trust
More common than the funded life insurance trust is
the unfunded life insurance trust, whereby the grantor is
insured. The grantor takes out the policy 2 and assigns it
to a trustee who, as beneficiary, will receive the proceeds of
the policy on the death of the insured. The grantor makes
periodic gifts to the trust which the trustee uses to pay
insurance premiums on his life. At the death of the grantor,
19 IN. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §677(a) (3).
20 Care must be taken to make sure that the trust will not be deemed
a "support" trust, with resulting income taxation of the trust income to the
son or son-in-law.
21 Alternatively, the policy may be applied for by one having an insurable
interest in the insured, as in the case of the settlor who is the grandfather
or wife of the insured.
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the policy proceeds are paid to the trustee who holds them
in accordance with the dispositive provisions of the trust.
The unfunded life insurance trust provides no income
tax saving, but the grantor has use of the money on which
income tax has been paid. The gift and estate taxes are
usually avoided. Since the grantor has no incidents of owner-
ship at his death,2 there will be no estate tax. To the
extent that the grantor takes advantage of his $30,000 per-
sonal exemption (and that of his wife) 23 and the annual
gift tax exclusions, he may avoid the gift tax. The annual
exclusion may be lost as gifts of future interests, 4 but will
be available if the grantor makes use of the special provisions
of the Code which preserve the exclusion for a gift to a trust
for the benefit of a minor.2
b (3). Eliminating the grantors control
The principal problem of all transfers in trust is, of
course, the desire of the grantor to retain control. Here,
we deal with those situations where the principal of a life
insurance trust is included in his gross estate by virtue of
his possession of incidents of ownership. _  _
Typical of the rights held by the grantor at death which
have caused this result are: (1) the right to change the
beneficiary;" (2) the right to revoke the assignment of the
22 INT. RE;V. CODE OF 1954, §2042(2).
23 INT. REV. CODE bF 1954, § 2521. If the transfer is of the grantor's
separate property, the wife's consent to the use of her exemption is
required.24 
INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §2503(b).
2
6 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2503(c). The wisest practice is to establish
a separate trust for each minor child and carefully trace the language of
§2503(c) to insure that the gift will qualify as not being a gift of a
future interest. By several nonacquiescenses, the Commissioner has indicated
his intention to require strict compliance with the statute. Accord, Carl
E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962), noiacq., 1963-2 CuM. BuLu. 6; Jacob Konner,
35 T.C. 727 (1961), nonacq., 1963-2 CuM. BuLL. 6; Arlean L Herr, 35
T.C. 732 (1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1962).
26 The statute deals with possession, not retention, of incidents of owner-
ship. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
27Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373- (7th* Cir. 1957); Estate of
Rhodes v. Commissioner, 174 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1949); Estate of Seward v.
Commissioner, 164 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1947); Helvering v. Estate of Reybine,
83 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1936) (portion of- insurance paid for by decedent
includible under 1926 Revenue Act where decedent could change beneficiaries
of policies after assignment to trust). "
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policy;' (3) the right to borrow on the policy; 9 (4) the
right to the cash surrender value of the policy;30 (5) the
right to the income from the policy;3" and (6) the right to
cancel the policy and reinvest the cash surrender value in
the grantor. 2
In a few cases, the.Tax Court has ruled that the right
to replace an individual cotrustee,33 the right to income from
the trust in excess of the amount needed to pay premiums,"'
and the fact that the decedent received dividends and income
on a few of the policies transferred in trust 35 did not constif-
tute incidents of ownership. Such cases can hardly be used
as a basis for planning. Even assuming that they are correct
under section 2042, transfers in trust with such powers re-
tained may still be subject to attack under section 2036 or
2038.
While most estate tax cases involving life insurance
trusts have presented situations where the insured was
grantor, in a few unusual situations, the insured has been
held to possess an incident of ownership even though he did
not establish the trust.
Such a case is Estate of Karagheusian.36 There, the
wife of the insured, took out the insurance on the life of
her husband. All rights of ownership in the policy vested
2 8Estate of Seward v. Commissioner, supra note 27.
29 Estate of Rhodes v. Commissioner, supra note 27.
80 Ibid.
alEstate of Selznick, 15 T.C. 716 (1950), aff'd, 195 F2d 735 (9th
Cir. 1952);- Estate of Herbert G. Larsh, 8 CICH TAx CT. MEm. 799
(1949) (grantor retained right to income for life plus power to amend
or revoke).
32 Estate of Selznick, supra note 31.
83Estate of N. Carlton, 34 T.C. 988 (1960), re'd on other grounds,
298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962) (any control decedent would have acquired
had he appointed himself cotrustee would have been jointly with a corporate
trustee and solely for the benefit of the trust). But cf. State Street Trust
Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
3- Estate of N. Carlton, supra note 33 (there never was any excess income
over the amount needed to pay premiums and the right to dividends on the
policies had been assigned to the trustees).
B Estate of L. Richards, 20 T.C. 904 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 221
F2d 808 (9th Cir. 1955) (no finding that decedent had retgined the right
to the income from the trust).
ae Coimissioner v. Estate of Karagheusian, 233 F2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956),
reversing 23 T.C. 806 (1955).
[ VOL. 41
1966 ] LIFE INSURANCE, ESTATE PLANNING 27
in her for life, then to their daughter, for life, and finally to
insured, his executors, administrators or assigns.
The wife then executed a trust, retaining a power of
revocation and a power of modification with respect to the
trust exercisable only in conjunction with her daughter and
husband, or the survivor. The husband died. The Tax Court
ruled a portion of the insurance proceeds includible in the
husband's gross estate on the theory that some of the premi-
ums on the policy were paid in part out of income from
property which he had contributed to the trust. Both the
Commissioner and the taxpayer appealed to the second
circuit. In that court, the entire proceeds were held includ-
ible, since the husband possessed an incident of ownership
by reason of his wife's retention of the power to revoke or
modify the trust with his consent. The court said:
The decedent, acting with his wife and daughter, had the power at
any time until his death to determine the ultimate distribution of
the insurance proceeds. This power was an incident of ownership
within the meaning of Section 811(g) (2) (B). . .. 37
b (4). Transfers in contemplation of death,
In 1927, the Commissioner took the position that the
proceeds of life insurance were not taxable under the provi-
sions of the estate tax law with regard to transfers in con-
templation of death, since the statute contained specific
provisions governing the taxation of insurance." In 1936,
he revoked this earlier ruling, and took the position that the
excess over $40,000 would be includible in the decedent's
gross estate if the insurance was assigned by way of a
transfer in contemplation of death, or if it was intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death."9
With the elimination of the $40,000 exemption for life insur-
ance proceeds in 1942, life insurance became subject to a
37Id. at 200. The present statute is INT. REv. CoDm or 1954,§ 2042 (2).
38 G.C.M. 1164, VI-1 Cum. BULL. 315 (1927).
sD G.C.M. 16932, XV-2 Cum. BuLL. 299 (1936).
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possible transfer in contemplation of death like any other
property."0
If the policy is transferred in contemplation of death,
the entire proceeds are includible. But if the transfer is of
the premiums or of fuqnds to pay premiums, the amount in-
cludible is that portion of the proceeds allocable to those
premiums transferred in contemplation of death. 1
Planning for the insured's payment of the premiums
thus becomes somewhat precarious. For example, suppose
that the insured takes out a policy for four years prior to
his death, assigns the policy to an unfunded life insurance
trust, and then pays four annual premiums. The Commis-
sioner has contended that three-fourths of the life insurance
proceeds should be included in the decedent's gross estate.
While such a case has not reached the courts, internal reve-
nue agents throughout the country have advanced this position
in auditing estate tax returns.
Fortunately, there is one case decided by the Tax Court
which supports the taxpayer where the insured paid the
premiums over a period of time as part of a planned program.
In Estate of Israel," the decedent paid premiums on life
40 The test of whether the transfer was in contemplation of death or not
is, of course, a factual issue. Cases holding that the transfer of life insur-
ance was in contemplation of death include: Estate of Garrett v, Com-
missioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Estate of Sloan v. Commissioner,
168 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1948); Estate of Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 758 (1947); Estate of Diamond v.
Commissioner, 159 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1947); Estate of Davidson v.
Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1946); Estate of Vanderlip v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728 (1946);
First Trust & Deposit Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F.2d 940 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 744 (1943); Liebmann v. Hassett, 50 F. Supp. 537 (D.
Mass. 1943), aff'd, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945). Cases holding that the
transfer of life insurance was not in contemplation of death include: Estate
of Aaron v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 314 (3d Cir. 1955); Estate of Singer
v. 'Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1952); Estate of Flick v. Commis-
sioner, 166 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1948); Estate of Cronin v. Commissioner,
164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947); Estate of Cowles v. United States, 152 F.2d
212 (2d Cir. 1945).
41 Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (ist Cir. 1945) ; Estate of Vanderlip,
3 T.C. 358, aff'd, 155 F2d 152 (2d Ci-.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 728-
(1946) (entire yroceeds includible where decedent paid all premiums after
transfer bf pohcy). 'Under present law, only those premiunis paid during
the last three years of decedent's life could be considered in contemplation
of death.
42 44 P-H TAx CT. M-id. 1423 (1944). " -
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insurance policies held in trust by making gifts to the trust
over a period of time for that purpose. The Tax Court held
that since the premiums were paid pursuant to a well estab-
lished custom of the decedent. in making such gifts with the
intention of preserving the principal of the trust, they were
not paid in contemplation of death.
Sometimes a transfer will be made in contemplation of
death and the assignor will receive back from the transferee
a consideration. In such event, the amount includible in the
gross estate is the value of the proceeds less the consideration
received back by the transferor.3 Such transfers should, of
course, be avoided because of the income tax rule which
causes the transferee to reaize gain on the death of the
insured to the extent that the proceeds exceed the consider-
ation which he has paid.4"
The planner should make every effort to avoid transfers
in contemplation of death. A planned program extending
over a period of years commencing sometime prior to the
three-year presumptive period should rebut the presumption
of "in contemplation of death" with regard to payments made
during the last three years of life. Limited pay policies may
be used with the thought that the insurance may be paid up
prior to the three-year presumptive period.. Transfers for
value should be avoided as they may well result in adverse
income tax consequences to the transferee with little estate
tax relief for the transferor.
b (5). The problems of community property
Up to this point, we have assumed that we are dealing
with life insurance in a common-law state, or with separate
property in a community property jurisdiction. When we
turn to the problems of community property, an additional
set of rules comes into play.45 If the insured transfers an
-s3 Estate of Pritchard, 4 T.C. 204 (1944).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2).
45 If any portion of the proceeds is to be treated as the insured's separate
property, a similar tax result can be obtained but only if the proceeds are
qualified for the marital deduction. INT. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954, §2056(a);(b) (6).
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asset of the community to his spouse, he changes the com-
munity property into the separate property of the transferee.
In jurisdictions such as Arizona, California and Idaho, where
dual ownership is recognized, either spouse may make this
conversion. However, in Texas, where the husband is the
manager of the community, he may convert community
property into separate property of the wife, but the wife has
no power to convert her interest in the community into her
husband's separate property.
Normally transfers of policies to the spouse should be
avoided. The better approach is to assign the policy to an
unfunded irrevocable life insurance trust, and to transfer
the funds to the trust to meet premium payments.
If the insured fails to make a complete transfer, or if he
makes the transfer in contemplation of death or with some
interest retained, some value will be included in his gross
estate. If the transfer is of community property, the amount
includible is measured by the insured's one-half of the
community property.
The characterization of life insurance as community or
separate property is complicated because: (1) the law has
used different theories for different community property
states; (2) there may be a difference in the transferor's
marital status between the time a policy is taken out and
the time of payment of premiums; and (3) there are differ-
ences depending upon whether the transfer is of the policy,
the proceeds, or the funds to pay premiums.
The amount includible in the insured's gross estate is
based on the proceeds of the policy, but only if the insured
is the first to die. If his spouse should predecease him, the
value of her community interest in the life insurance policy
(one-half of the interpolated terminal reserve value as of
the date of her husband's death) is includible." If the pro-
ceeds are payable to someone other than the wife, on the
death of the insured, the wife surviving, the wife is deemed
46 Rev. Rul. 48, 1953-1 Cum. Bum 392.
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to have made a gift of her one-half community interest in
the proceeds to the beneficiary of the policy27
Except for the period from 194,2 to 1948, when estate
taxation of community property was based on a federal
statute,"8 the estate taxation of life insurance proceeds in
community property jurisdictions has been governed by local
law. 9 Differences in local law have caused the courts to use
different approaches. In Washington and California, pro-
ceeds are said to be community or separate property in pro-
portion to the amount of community or separate funds used
to pay premiums. Where the husband, as the insured, took
out insurance on his own life prior to marriage, paid one
premium out of separate funds, married, and paid all later
premiums out of community funds, the Supreme Court held
that the amount includible in the husband's gross estate was
the total proceeds reduced by one-half of the portion of the
proceeds allocable to the premiums paid after marriage."
In Louisiana and Texas, the proceeds are community or
separate, depending upon the "inception of title" doctrine,
i.e., the characterization of the policy at the time it was
taken out. By this approach, it is immaterial who pays the
premiums for purposes of distinguishing separate from com-
munity property.
47 Ibid.48 INT. REv. CoDE of 1939, § 811(g)(4), added by Rev. Act of 1942,
repealed by Rev. Act of 1948. Held constitutional, insofar as the section
requires inclusion of entire proceeds of insurance paid out of community
where insured retained incidents of ownership and surviving spouse could
not show that any of the funds were originally hers, in Fernandez v. Wiener,
326 U.S. 340 (1945).49 Lang v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 264 (1938), holding that Bank of
America Natl Trust & Savings Assoc. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 981 (9th
Cir. 1937) was wrongly decided. The latter case held that provisions of
local law had no significance in determining taxability of proceeds. See
also Estate of Louisa Morris Carroll, 29 B.T.A. 11 (1933) (Louisiana
community property law held controlling).
S0 See Lang v. Commissioner, supra note 49, at 267. The California
law prior to July 29, 1927, was much the same as the community property
law of New Mexico today. The wife had no interest in the community prior
to her husband's death. If she died firs% nothing passed at her death.
Effective July 29, 1927, the California legislature gave the wife a vested
interest in the community. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the
nature of insurance proceeds was determined by whether premiums were paid
out of pre-1927 or post-1927.community property. Estate of George W.
Fuhr, 42 P-H B.T.A. MFmn. Dmc 410'(1942) ; Flate of Daniel G. Arbuthnot
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- In a 1953 ruling,"' the Comiissioner illustrated the
operation of the Louisiana and Texas rule:
The ruling posed five hypothetical situations, in each
of which it was assumed that the beneficiary of the policy
was: (1) anyone other than the surviving spoise or the
estate of the insured; (2) the surviving spouse; and (3)
the insured's estate. In all five situations the insured hus-
band retained the incidents of ownership. The five hypo-
thetical situations were as follows:
1. Husband takes out the policy while married; all
premiums are paid out of community funds;
2. Husband takes out the policy while married; all
premiums are paid from his separate funds;
3. Husband takes out the policy while married; all
premiums are paid out of wife's separate funds;
4. Husband takes out the policy while single; pays one
premium before marriage; wife pays the balance of the pre-
miums out of her separate funds after marriage;
5. Husband takes out the policy while single; pays one
premium before marriage; pays the balance of the pre-
miums out of community funds after marriage.
In the fourth and fifth hypotheticals, thie Commissioner
adopted the "inception of title" doctrine, holding that since
the policy was taken out while the insured was single, the
proceeds were his separate property and includible in his
gross estate, without regard to who paid the premiums.52
In.the first hypothetical, the proceeds were community
property under the "inception of title" rule. Accordingly,
only one-half of the proceeds were includible in the gross
42 P-H B.T.A. MEm. Dic. 919 (1942); Estate of Albert Scheuer, 40 P-H
B.T.A. MEt.. -Dc. 248 (1940); E. C. McCoy, 39 B.T.A. 822 (1939),
acq.; Estate of Victor Eisner, 39 P-H B.T.A. Muat. DEc. 824 (1939).
51 Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 Cum, BuLT 268.
52 The ruling is somewhat unclear as to the basis for the Commissioner's
ruling in the fifth hypothetical. In the fourth hypothetical, 'the "inception of
title!' doctrine is clearly controlling. In the fifth situation, however, the
Commissioner first stated that-the insured "possessed incidents of ownership"
and then ruled:- "The policy here is regarded under applicable Louisiana
Law as a -separate asset of the insured." .-
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estate of the husband, regardless of the identity of the
beneficiary. In the case where the beneficiary was someone
other than the surviving spouse, the wife was deemed to have
made a taxable gift of one-half of the proceeds at her
husband's death.
In the second hypothetical, where the husband paid all
the premiums out of his separate funds, the Commissioner
abandoned the "inception of title" iloctrine, and held that
the insurance policy was the separate property of the husband
in this circumstance under applicable Louisiana law. Ac-
cordingly, the entire amount of the proceeds was includ-
ible.
In the third hypothetical, where the wife paid the pre-
miums out of her separate funds, but where the husband
retained the incidents of ownership, the Commissioner
reached the anomalous result that the entire proceeds were
includible in the husband's gross estate by virtue of his
retention of the incidents of ownership.
Throughout this 1953 ruling, the Commissioner took the
position that might conceivably provide the greatest revenue,
except where the law was clearly to the contrary. If there
was any doubt, the proceeds were said to be includible,
whether the reason given was the possession of incidents
of ownership, the payment of premiums, or the fact that the
proceeds constituted the insured's separate property.
While payment of premiums is no longer a test for
inclusion in the gross estate, it is significant as a test for
determining whether the proceeds are separate or community
property. Even under the "inception of title" theory, where
the husband paid the premiums out of his separate funds,
the proceeds were held to be his separate property for this
reason. The problem arises, of course, through the failure
to distinguish the tests for includibility of life insurance
under the tax law from the tests for determining whether
the policy, proceeds, or premiums constituted separate or
community property.
Much of the confusion in the cases is attributable to the
fact that prior to 1954, the "payment of premiums test" was
significant for both purposes.
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Fortunately, the courts have not been as rigorous in the
application of the tests as the Commissioner in his 1953
ruling. Where the insured is married at the time he takes
out the policy, and all the premiums are paid from com-
munity funds, the courts agree that only one-half of the
proceeds are includible. 3 Difficulties arise only where the
insurance is taken out while the insured is single and
premiums are paid during marriage.
Despite the occasional reference to "inception of title"
in rulings having an orientation to Louisiana 5" or Texas," the
courts have consistently held that the source for the payment
of premiums is ultimately determinative of whether proceeds
are to be treated as community or separate property. 6
The question remains whether the taxpayer or the Com-
missioner has the burden of proving that the premiums are
paid from separate or community funds. Since the deter-
mination of whether property is properly classified as com-
munity or separate property is a question of local law, the
fifth circuit has taken the view that, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, payments of premiums by a mar-
ried person will be considered to be out of community,
53 DeLappe v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1940) (Louisiana);
Estate of S. Moody, 42 B.T.A. 987 (1940) (Texas); Townsend v. Thomas,
42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. IT 10,155 (D. Tex. 1942).
.
54 Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 C-um. BurL. 268.
55 Rev. Rul. 54-272, 1954-2 Cum. BLTLL. 298 (H takes out policy before
marriage and pays one premium out of separate funds; H then marries and
pays all other premiums out of community funds. Held: Since the char-
acter of the policy is determined at the time it is taken out, the policy
constitutes H's separate property and the entire proceeds are includible where
H retains incidents of ownership).5s Stapf v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other issues, 309 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1962), reVd
as to other issues, 375 U.S. 118 (1963) (premiums paid on policies issued
prior to marriage from separate funds before marriage and from Texas
community funds after marriage; held: "that part of the total insurance
monies, measured by the same proportion as the sum of the premiums paid
from the decedent's separate estate, plus one-half of the premiums paid from
the community estate, bears to the total amount of all premiums paid is
includible in decedent's gross estate); Estate of 0. Levy, 42 B.T.A. 991
(1940) (policies purchased subsequent to H's marriage includible at one-
half their value; policies purchased prior to marriage includible to extent
of premiums paid from H's separate funds or his share of the Louisiana
community property)'; Estate of S. Moody, 42 B.T.A. 987 (1940) (pro-
ceeds of policies less one-half of proportion of total proceeds which premiums
satisfied with Texas community funds bore to total premiums held
includible).
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rather than separate funds.5 Often this will be to the
taxpayer's advantage if the question is whether all or only
one-half of the proceeds are includible in the decedent's
gross estate. In the case, however, where the husband has
transferred a policy to his wife, thereby making it her sep-
arate property, it would be wise to make sure that the
premiums are clearly paid out of the wife's separate funds,
to avoid the possible argument that upon the husband's
death the proceeds constituted "community property" where
the premiums were paid out of community funds.
From the standpoint of planning, the estate planner
should remember the following:
1. Avoid assignments of policies by a husband directly
to his wife. While a large amount of insurance is sold on
the theory that the insured can place the title to the policy
in his wife, good planning calls for avoidance of this method
completely. In the first place, the insured not infrequently
fails to completely transfer the policy. He may fail to
make complete delivery of the policy; he may continue to
pay premiums out of community funds; or he may subse-
quently try to use the policy for his own purposes, e.g., as
collateral to obtain a loan to assist him in his business.
Probably the most disastrous result of an incomplete
transfer is that upon the husband's death, the Commissioner
can move in several directions to attack his estate. He may
contend, for example, that the husband never gave up
incidents of ownership, with the result that at least fifty
percent of the proceeds of the policy is includible in his gross
estate; or he may argue that since the transfer is complete,
the husband made a series of gifts to his wife by way of
transfer of the policy or the premiums, which may be subject
to gift tax. If gift tax returns were not filed at the time of
such transfers, the husband's estate may be subject to a gift
tax liability, with penalties and interest.
57 Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942). But sge
Estate of Rule v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 351 (Ct. C1. 1945) (taxpayer
had burden of proving that premiums were paid out of post-1927, rather than
pre-1927, California community property).
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But even if we assume that the assignment of the policy
to the wife were successful, it may be of little value from
the standpoint of the over-all estate plan. If the wife should
predecease the husband, the interpolated terminal reserve
value of the entire policy (since it would be her separate
property) would be includible in her gross estate. In addi-
tion, it not infrequently happens that where the policy is
assigned to a wife, she is also named sole beneficiary. If
she should predecease, the policy, or a portion of it, may
well revert to the husband by virtue of her will, or by
operation of the laws of intestacy.
2. Use an unfunded irrevocable life insurance trust.
If the client's primary purpose is to provide liquidity of his
estate without having the insurance proceeds taxed thereto,
the unfunded irrevocable life insurance trust will normally be
the wisest solution. Typically, this trust is established during
the lifetime of the settlor with an independent trustee as
assignee and beneficiary of the policy. The settlor makes
annual gifts of sufficient monies to pay premiums on the
policies on his own life. Then, at the death of the insured,
the insurance company pays the proceeds of the policy to the
trustee who, by the terms of the trust, has the power to
purchase assets from the estate of the insured. The trustee
purchases these assets, thereby providing liquid funds for
the estate. To prevent the transfer of funds to pay premiums
from being classified as gifts of present interests, it will be
necessary, more often than not, to invest the trustee with
broad discretion with respect to the administration of the
trust. The result is that it may be necessary to forego the
annual $3,00G exclusions for donees. If it is desired to take
advantage of these exclusions, section 2503 (c) trusts may be
used where the beneficiaries are minors, or the donor may
set up a wholly separate gift program whereby property
other than insurance or funds for the payment of premiums
becomes the subject of the gifts.
P reserving the Family Business
After the problems of liquidity and meeting the death
'tax burden have been resolved, the next major planning
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objective is often the preservation of the decedent's interest
in a family business. While this may be done by having an
unfunded life insurance trust purchase the business assets
from the decedent's estate, it is sometimes more satisfactory
to arrange for the business to purchase the decedent's
interest.
The buy-sell agreement funded with life insurance pro-
vides a convenient method for accomplishing this result.
Where the only persons involved are members of the same
family, the planning problems are quite different from those
present when two or more business associates are dealing
with one another at arm's length. In the latter case, the
plan may have to be arranged with a view to liquidating the
decedent's interest for the estate.
Where Surviving Business Interests do not Belong to
Members of the Decedent's Family
Assume that two partners, A and B, have been operating
a mercantile business for some years. A plan is adopted
whereby the first to die will sell his interest to the survivor.
The principal problem is finding the liquid assets in the
hands of the surviving partner to buy out the deceased
partner's interest. The solution is an insurance plan to
provide the necessary liquidity.
A buy-sell agreement, drawn either as a separate agree-
ment, or as a part of a revised partnership agreement, sets
out the terms whereby the estate of the first to die will sell
to the survivor. In a two or three-man partnership, each
partner takes out insurance on the life of the other. The
agreement provides that in the event of the death of a
partner, the surviving partner (s) will buy the deceased part-
ner's interest. With four or more partners, this "cross-
purchase" arrangement becomes awkward, and the "entity"
approach, whereby the partnership entity purchases the
insurance, is used.
Both methods present planning problems: if the part-
ners are of different ages, adjustments must be made for
differences in premium costs. Moreover, the partner who
most needs the insurance is often the least insurable. Family
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facts are important: partner A may have a son capable of
taking over his interest in the business, while partner B may
be childless and unconcerned about the disposition of his
interest at death. Or A may be a grandfather, while B is
raising a family. Or the partnership may be of the personal
service type, where much of the value dies with the death of
the partner.
In drafting the buy-sell agreement, the planner carefully
considers the nature of the business. One of his problems
is its ever-changing value, with the resulting effect on the
price which the surviving partners are willing to pay.
If the agreement is carefully drawn, the price fixed by
arm's length bargaining will control the valuation of the
partner's interest for estate tax purposes. The estate must
be bound to sell either by giving the surviving partners an
option or by binding all the parties. In addition, the price
must not be so grossly inadequate as to make the agreement
a "mere gratuitous promise."58
58 Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237; Rev. Rul. 54-76, 1954-1
Cum. Buu.m 194 (binding option to purchase controlling where corporation
exercises option). Many cases have upheld estate tax valuations based
on various types of buy-sell agreements. See, e.g., Brodrick v. Gore, 224
F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955) (date-of-death book value controls where partner's
estate was bound to sell deceased partner's interest to co-partners); Wor-
cester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1943)
(restrictions on stock transfer affected value);, Lomb v. Sugden, 82 F2d
166 (2d Cir. 1936) (value of closely held stock based on stockholders'
agreement) ; Wilson v. Bowers, 57 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1932) (value reduced
by virtue of binding option effective at death); Citizens Fidelity Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (valid
option agreement fixed value for estate tax purpose; agreement not valid
under rule against perpetuities or as restraint on alienation); Davis v.
United States, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1902 (D. Utah 1960) (value de-
termined by binding and valid partnership agreement); Angela Fiorito,
33 T.C. 440 (1959) (value of decedent's partnership interest limited to
option price); Estate of Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 181 (1958); Estate
of Albert I. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951) (restrictive agreement controlling);
Estate of Lelia E. Coulter, 7 T.C. 1280 (1946); Estate of John Q. Strange,
42 P-H TAx CT. MEm. 605 (1942) (option price held controlling); Estate
of John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938) (value based on purchase
agreement); Anson v. Prouty, 5 B.T.A. 107 (1926). On the other hand,
there have been a number of cases where the agreement was not so strictly
drafted as to affect the value of the business interest. United States v.
Land, 303 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1962) (discount on value when sold during
life did not affect value at death); Armstrong's Estate v. Commissioner,
146 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1944) (value not affected by purchase agreement);
Estate of Harry W. Hammond, 55 P-H TAx CT. MEm. 69 (1955);
Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944); Estate of Virgil D.
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Some buy-sell agreements provide that the deceased
partner's interest shall be bought at a fixed price or at a
price determined from the book value of the assets, often
without any allowance for good will. Others provide for
an appraisal of the deceased partner's interest upon his death.
Still other agreements set prices which are contingent upon
future earnings expectations. Whatever the method, the
planner must provide an arrangement which will be equally
valid if a partner should die tomorrow, or thirty years hence.
By combining some of these methods, the planner can
reach a realistic result. le may provide that the assets
should be periodically revalued (e.g., once a year, or once
every two years), and in the event of a failure to do so
over a long period of time (e.g, five years), book value, or
a value to be derived by some appraisal method, should be
controlling. Whatever method is chosen, he must make
certain that the life insurance proceeds will be sufficient to
purchase the decedent's interest from his estate. Thus, a
periodic review of the client's business assets and estate
becomes essential.
If the planner's method produces too low a valuation
the results can be disastrous. Low valuation for estate tax
purposes may cause the deceased partner's estate to have an
undesirable basis for the partnership interest, or for the
consideration received upon the liquidation of such interest.
An unrealistic valuation may result in burdensome liti-
gation with the decedent's heirs. In one case, a young man
convinced his senior partner, who was much older, that an
extremely low valuation in the buy-sell agreement would be
desirable for estate tax purposes. Upon the death of the
senior partner, the young man bought the deceased's interest
in the partnership at the low price fixed in the agreement.
Thereupon, the deceased partner's widow sought to have the
contract nullified as unconscionable. The court ruled for
her, and required the young man to pay her the fair market
value of the deceased partner's interest. Needless to say,
Giannini, 2 T.C. 1160 (1943), aff'd without discussion of point, 148 F.2d
285 (9th Cir. 1945) (decedent had full power to dispose of property during
life, option in brother arose only on decedent's death).
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the Internal Revenue Service revalued the deceased partner's
interest in the light of this decision."
If the partnership continues to increase in value, there
may be insufficient insurance proceeds to purchase the
deceased partner's interest. Or, conversely, if it appears that
the proceeds will be in excess of the amount needed to
purchase the interest of the partner at death, provision must
be made for the disposition of the excess. The partnership
should consider whether insurance is the best method for
funding the agreement. In some situations, it may be more
desirable to provide a combination of life insurance with
other forms of investment, thus providing flexibility in the
total funds available.
If the cross-purchase plan is used, the interpolated
terminal reserve value of the cross-insurance owned by a
partner on the life of another partner will be included in
the owner's gross estate for estate tax purposes if he should
predecease the insured. Similarly, a pro rata portion of the
proceeds of entity insurance may be included in a partner's
estate, unless the parties are careful to eliminate all indivi-
dual incidents of ownership. Cross-insurance should be pay-
able to and owned by the surviving partners. Entity insur-
ance should be payable to and owned by the partnership.
This is true, despite some case law which indicates the desir-
ability of having key-man insurance payable to the family
of the insured. 0 Insurance should be incidentaZ to the buy-
sell agreement, not an integral part of the arrangement.
While insurance is only one method of funding a buy-sell
agreement, in most cases it is the most desirable. Since
the insured has no incidents of ownership, nothing is includ-
ible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes. The surviv-
ing partners are not liable for any income tax, since the
proceeds are payable by reason of the death of the insured.
No gain or loss is realized by the partner's estate on
the sale of the interest since it receives a stepped-up basis
59 Cf. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (minority
stockholder entitled to establish fairness of transaction on remand).
60 See Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959). The
Commissioner will not follow this decision. Rev. Rul. 61-134, 1961-2 CuM.
Bum.. 250.
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equal to the fair market value of the partnership interest
at the date of the death of the partner. In handling the
purchase of the interest, the purchasers must be careful to
provide for any optional inside basis adjustment among the
surviving partners." Care must be taken that the sale
generates no ordinary income to the seller by reason of the
sale of "unrealized receivables" or substantially appreciated
inventory. 2
Where Surviving Business Interests Belong to Members of
the Same Family
When we turn to the problems of planning the estate
for one whose business interests will pass to members of his
own family, the planning problems must be approached in a
different manner. To illustrate these problems, assume a
more or less typical situation involving a family corporation:
Father, now age sixty, formerly owned all of the out-
standing stock of Widgets, Inc. By some earlier planning,
he transferred one-fourth of the outstanding stock to Son,
who is married and has three children. Son works in
Father's business as vice-president in charge of production.
Father also transferred another one-fourth of the stock to a
trust for the benefit of Daughter. By the terms of the trust,
the trustee might pay or accumulate income for the benefit
of Daughter during her lifetime, and at her death, distribute
the principal and accumulated income to her then living
children. Daughter is married to a doctor and has two
children. Since Widgets, Inc., has followed a policy of not
paying a dividend, Daughter has never realized any income
from the trust.
How might life insurance be used to accomplish Father's
estate objectives, and preserve the family business?
As applied to Son and Daughter, Father's estate objec-
tives are quite different. Daughter's interest in Widgets,
Inc., is that it may some day pay her a dividend income,
and provide her children with an appreciated investment.
61 1NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 743, 754.6 2 INT. I-V. CODE OF 1954, § 751.
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Son's primary interest in the business will be to improve
the Company along lines envisioned by Father. He wants
Widgets, Inc., to expand, and perhaps eventually "go public,"
becoming a strong growth stock.
Not to be forgotten is Widow. -Upon Father's death,
if she survives him, one-half of his holdings will go to her
either as her one-half of the community property, or through
a marital deduction trust if Father's stock is his separate
property. Assuming Father's will provides that she shall
take this one-half, and that the remaining one-half of Father's
interest will pass to Son outright and to Daughter's trust,
in equal shares, after the death of Father, Widow will own
25 per cent of Widgets, Inc., while Son and the trust for
Daughter will each own 3712 per cent.
What arrangements should Father make to insure a
satisfactory disposition of his estate at death?
First of all, assuming Father is insurable, Widgets, Inc.,
can insure his life. The premiums paid will not constitute
income " to Father, nor will they be deductible "' to Widgets,
Inc. On Father's death, Widgets, Inc., will use the funds
to redeem Father's stock. No gain will be recognized to
Father's estate, since the estate will acquire a stepped-up
basis on Father's death. 5 To the extent that the proceeds
from the redemption are used to pay death taxes or funeral
and administration expenses under section 303, there is no
danger of the redemption being treated as a dividend.6 To
qualify for this special treatment, Father's stock ownership
in Widgets, Inc., must equal more than 35 per cent of his
gross estate or 50 per cent of his taxable estate.6" If quali-
3 Sanders v. Fox, 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958); Prunier v. Com-
missioner, 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1958); Casale v. Commissioner, 247
F.2d 440 (2d Cir. 1957). The Internal Revenue Service will follow these
cases. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 65.64 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 264(a) (1); Treas. Reg. § 1264-1. Premiums
may be deductible as a business expense of the employer, Widgets, Inc.,
under § 162, where premiums represent additional compensation to employees.
In that event, the added income is includible in the employee's gross income.
Such a plan might be used to avoid an excessive accumulation of profits
or where it was feared that compensation of Father might otherwise be
deemed excessive.6 5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.66 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(a).
67 INT, RnV. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b) (2) (A).
[ VOL.. 41
1966 ] LIFE INSURANCE, ESTATE PLANNING 43
fication under section 303 is impossible, or if additional
liquidity is desired, additional redemptions after Father's
estate is closed may proceed under the special rules of section
302.
In working out a substantially disproportionate redemp-
tion, or a redemption of stockholder's entire interest, the
planner must proceed with utmost caution.
After Father's death, Widow will own 25 per cent,
Son 371/2 per cent, and the trust for Daughter 371/,2 per
cent. Under the new rules for attribution to estates, while
Father's estate is in administration, it will be deemed to
own 100 per cent of the stock." A stock redemption under
section 302 at this time will be treated as a dividend.69
But suppose the parties wait until the estate is closed. Now,
for purposes of section 302, Widow will be deemed as owning
100 per cent of the stock,"' while Son and the trust for
Daughter will each be deemed to own 621/2 per cent of the
stock.1 Hence, if all of the stock (371 per cent) owned
by the trust for Daughter is redeemed, such a redemption
would qualify as a substantially disproportionate redemp-
tion,"2 although it would not qualify as a redemption of a
stockholder's entire interest."
6s IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a) (3) (A). Attribution from the estate
causes the stock to be deemed as owned in. proportion to the beneficiaries'
interest. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a) (2) (A).
,6 The chances of qualifying the redemption under § 302(b)(1) are so
negligible that they may be ignored.
70 Widow is deemed as owning the stock of both Son and the trust
for Daughter. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a) (1) (A) (ii). The interest
owned by the trust for Daughter is treated as owned by Daughter by virtue
of the language "directly or indirectly."
71While Widow's ownership (25%) is attributed to both Son and the
trust for Daughter, §318(a)(1)(A)(ii), the attribution to them cannot
cause their stock to be attributed to each other. INT. REv. CoDE OF
1954, §318(a)(5)(B). Sidewise attribution for partnerships, estates, trusts
and corporations was not eliminated until 1964. See §318(a)(5)(C).
72 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 303(b)(2). The ratio of the stock at-
tributed to the trust for Daughter after the redemption (40%) is less than
80% of the ratio of the stock attributed to the trust for Daughter before
the redemption (62/2%), as required by §302(b)(2)(C). The trust for
Daughter also owns less than 50% of the outstanding stock after the re-
demption, as required by § 302(b) (2) (B).
73The 25% of the stock owned by Widow would still be attributable
to the trust for Daughter, thereby preventing a redemption of Daughter's
entire interest. Cf. § 302(b) (3). The family attribution rules can, of
course, be avoided by Father's redeeming his interest prior to his death.
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By providing additional liquid funds for the corporation
to redeem more than that amount of stock necessary to meet
death taxes and funeral and administrative expenses, the
planner gives additional flexibility to the estate. The trust
for Daughter may use this additional liquidity to purchase
a diversified portfolio of investments thereby achieving the
estate objective of Father insofar as Daughter was concerned.
On the death of Widow, her 25 per cent ownership may pass
directly to Son, thereby giving him complete control of
Father's business.
Alternatively, of course, if Son has been successful in
causing Widgets, Inc., to "go public," the stock may have
acquired sufficient liquidity that some of the problems that
characterized Father's estate will have disappeared.
While .the provision for liquidity-having the business
purchase life insurance on its key men-is obviously advan-
tageous from the standpoint of resolving many of the prob-
lems that center around the demise of the principal leader
of a business, the income tax advantages to the business
must not be forgotten.
One of the principal advantages, of course, is the absence
of any realization of gain on the difference between the con-
sideration paid in the form of premiums and the proceeds
received upon the death of the insured.74 This advantage
§ 302(c). This approach, however, requires that Father realize a substantial
capital gain which could be avoided by postponing the redemption until
after death.
4 INT. RV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (1). Death benefits having char-
acteristics of life insurance proceeds are likewise excluded. Treas. Reg.
§1.101-1(a). If the contract involves no risk, it will not qualify as "in-
surance" resulting in a loss of the exclusion. Rev. Rul. 55-313, 1955-1
Cum. BuL.. 219 (single premium deferred annuity; no risk where insurer
required to pay the higher of consideration paid or cash surrender value
in event insured died before first payment); Rev. Rul. 65-57, 1965-1 Cum.
BULL. 56 (no risk in single premium insurance-annuity combinations). Sim-
ilarly, the life insurance proceeds will not qualify where one who takes out
insurance has no insurable interest in insured. Atlantic Oil Co. v. Patterson,
331 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1964). But cf. Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d
49 (6th Cir. 1959) (transfer by corporation, having insurable interest in its
president to stockholder-beneficiary; applicant of policy had insurable interest
in insured). At times, whether a particular payment constitutes life insurance
or non-excludable death benefits varies with the circumstances. Estate of
-Clarence L. Moyer, 32 T.C. 515 (1959) (stock exchange "gratuity fund"
held to be life insurance proceeds); Rev. Rul. 63-76, 1963-1 Cum. BULL.
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can be lost, however, if one runs afoul of the transfer for
value rule.
Under the terms of the rule, the exemption for life
insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the
insured is lost where the policy was acquired for a valuable
consideration."' The rule does not apply, however, in two
situations: (1) where the basis of the transferee is deter-
mined by reference to the transferor; and"M (2) where the
transfer is to the insured, a partner of the insured, a partner-
ship in which the insured is a partner, or a corporation in
which the insured is a shareholder or officer. 7
The second of these two exceptions presents a significant
tax break for the insured: the corporation in which the
insured is a stockholder or officer may buy from the insured
a policy on which he may have paid substantial premiums.
The insured acquires substantial cash from the corporation
without suffering the consequences of a dividend (or even
capital gain, if the corporation pays an amount equal to
the insured's investment in the policy) and transfers the
policy without any gift or estate tax consequences." Indeed,
such a transfer would be at least partially excluded from
the gross estate of the insured even if made in contemplation
of death, since section 2043 exempts such transfers to the
extent that they are made for an adequate and full consid-
eration in money or money's worth.
The transfer for value rule is not without some tax
traps. Quite often, transfers of life insurance policies will
be made among the insured, the corporation, or the bene-
ficiary without the careful planning essential for success.
23 (payments to beneficiary after death of one who had enjoyed retirement
plan). But cf. Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1962).
5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2); Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(b).
70 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2) (A) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)
(5), Examples (2), (3), and (4).
7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101(a) (2) (B); Treas. Reg. §1.101-1(b) (5),
Examples (5) and (7). The partnership or corporation may purchase a
policy from the insured at his cost, thereby causing him to receive cash
without tax detriment.
78 In the absence of this exception, the fact that the transfer was in con-
templation of death will not prevent the proceeds from being included under
the transfer for value rule. Bourne Bean, 14 C.C.H. TAx CT. MEm. 786
(1955).
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Recently, for example, on an estate tax audit of a
wealthy lady (W), who had been the major stockholder of
a family corporation, the following facts were discovered:
the corporation had many years previously taken out a
$500,000 policy on the life of W (the widow of the founder
and former president of the corporation), and had subse-
quently borrowed the maximum loan value ($100,000) on
the policy. Thinking that the policy would cause the stock
in W's estate to have an inflated value at her death, the
corporation transferred the policy, subject to the debt, to
W's children. It was thought that this would provide the
children with the necessary liquidity to meet the estate tax
liability on their mother's death. The children then dis-
covered that they would be recipients of a transfer for value
by virtue of their assumption of the debt."9 Accordingly, it
was decided to transfer the policy back to W, since section
101 (a) (2) (B) specifically exempts from the transfer for
value rule a transfer to the insured. None of these trans-
actions were reported at the time they occurred, but on the
audit of W's estate tax return, the Commissioner contended:
1. At the time the policy was transferred by the corp-
oration to the children, W received a dividend equal to the
interpolated terminal reserve value of the policy, less the
debt assumed;
2. W made a taxable gift to the children of the same
amount;
3. When the children transferred the policy back to W,
they made a taxable gift back to her. While they eliminated
the difficulty of the transfer for value rule, they unfortunately
7 See Spokane Dry Goods Co., 43 P-H TAx C. M EM. 559 (1943); cf.
Desks, Inc., 18 T.C. 647 (consideration greater than proceeds; proceeds not
taxed). Policies merely pledged are not considered transferred. Proceeds
received by the creditor are regarded as ordinary collection of a debt. But,
if creditor receives tax benefit by taking bad debt deduction, proceeds are
fully taxable. St. Louis Refrigerating & Cold Storage Co. v. United States,
66 F. Supp. 62 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd,. 162 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1947); T.O.
McCamant, 32 T.C. 824 (1959); cf. Durr Drug Co. v. United States, 99
F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1938) (not taxable where taxpayer creditor induced
individual debtor to insure himself for creditor's benefit, even though creditor
had taken bad debt deduction).
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caused the $500,000 proceeds of the policy to be included in
W's gross estate, since she now possessed the incidents of
ownership.
Had the children discovered their unfortunate situation
after the transfer by the corporation to them, a wiser course
would have been to have the policy cancelled for its cash
surrender value and to use the proceeds to purchase a new
policy on their mother's life. The amount of gain on such
cancellation would be small, since their basis would equal
the basis which W acquired by virtue of having realized the
dividend, plus the 5100,000 of debt which they assumed.
Planning the Employees' Insurance Program
Once the problems of liquidity of the estate, and the
preservation of the family business have been resolved, the
planner turns to a consideration of various approaches for
improvement of the client's life insurance program through
his employer. Since our hypothetical client, Father, is an
employee of Widgets, Inc., several employee plans are avail-
able to assist him in the building and conservation of his
estate.
Group Life Insurance
One of the oldest fringe benefits recognized by the tax
law is group-term life insurance. Where the employer pays
the premiums on such policies, he is entitled to a deduction, 0
although the premiums are not taxed as income to the
employee 3' In 1964, Congress limited this tax benefit by
providing that the cost of protection over $50,00 constituted
income to the employee.3 2 Income to the employee on this
800. 1014, 2 CuM. BuLL. 88 (1920) (deduction allowed as ordinary
business expense for premiums paid on group policies where employees desig-
natd beneficiaries); Rev. Rul. 400, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 116 (deduction
allowed on group life and hospitalization policies for commission salesmen,
whether or not employer-employee relation exists).
a' 0. 1014, 2 CuM. Buu-. 88 (1920) (premiums paid by employer on
lives of employees not taxable as income to employees) ; G.C.M. 16069, XV-1
CuM. Bum. 84 (1936).
82 INT. Rev. CoDE oF 1954, § 79, added by Revenue Act of 1964, 78 Stat
36 (1964).
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excess is based on rates for term insurance without loading
charges."
There are several exceptions to the new rule: (1) an
employee retired for age or disability is fully exempt;4
(2) the employee is not taxed to the extent that the employer
is a beneficiary directly or indirectly,"s or if a charity is the
sole beneficiary;"8 (3) the rule does not apply to any group
life insurance which is part of a qualified pension or profit
sharing plan."
The statute does not affect the tax status of group
permanent life insurance. The purchase by the employer
of such insurance constitutes income to the employee in the
same way as the purchase of individual life policies.8 The
employer receives a corresponding deduction as a business
expense, so long as he is not a direct or indirect beneficiary
of the insurance.89
If the right of the employee to permanent insurance is
forfeitable on termination of his employment, the premiums
are not taxable to the employee,9° nor are they deductible
to the employer.
83 The following table is used to compute the cost of group-term life
insurance on an employee's life for purposes of determining the amount
includible in his gross income:
5-year age bracket Cost per $1000 of Protection
for 1-month period
Under 30 ..... .... .... .... ..... .... .... $.08
30-34 ................. ........ 10
35-39 .............. .. .... ..... 14
40-44 ................... ......... ..... 23
45-49 ................... ......... ..... 40
50-54 ........ .... ............ ... .68
55-59 .... .... .... .... .. .... 1.10
60-64 ..... ............ . ... 1.63
The age of the employee is his attained age on the last day of his tax year.
If he has attained an age greater than age 64, he is treated as if he were 63.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 79(c); Rev. Rul. 65-28, 1965-1 Cum. BUL. 527.
8 4 INT. IEV. CODE OF 1954, § 79(b) (1).8 5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 79(b) (2) (A).
86 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 79(b) (2) (B).
87 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 79(b) (3).8 8 Mem. 6477, 1950-1 CuM. BULl. 16.
89 Rev. RuL 56-400, 1956-2 Cum. Buis- 116 (deduction allowed for
premiums on group life and hospitalization policies, benefits of which accrue
to commission salesmen, whether or not employet-employee relationship exists).
BoMem. 6477, 1950-1 Cums. BUu.. 16.
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Group-term, obviously, is the best policy for Widgets,
Inc. It provides the employer with a deduction without
income to the employee. If the employee leaves the service
of the employer, he may convert to a permanent form of life
insurance without adverse tax consequences."' Most life
insurance policies permit this conversion within a certain
period (e.g., 30 days) after termination of employment with-
out the necessity of a physical examination.
Although group-term policies have been a favorite of the
income tax law, they are not necessarily exempt from estate
tax. Whether they are depends upon the absence of inci-
dents of ownership in the insured. Some group policies
have provisions prohibiting the assignment of the policy."
Such provisions might be removed from the policy or waived
by the insurer so that the insured can make an assignment.
The insured should also assign his conversion privilege so
that the assignee can convert the policy to permanent life
if the insured should terminate his employment.
If assignment of the policy is impossible, the insured
may make an irrevocable designation of beneficiary. While
it has been contended that such a designation does not
survive the term of the contract,93 with the result that one
would have to make repeated assignments with the commence-
ment of each new term, the sounder view is that the group
life contract is a continuing one, and the rights of one who
had been irrevocably designated beneficiary would continue
despite subsequent renewals of the contract.
Under Treganowan,95 the insured has an incident of
ownership by virtue of his power to terminate his employ-
ment, and thereby to terminate the insurance. He can
remove this incident, however, by assigning the right to
91 Rev. Rul. 54-165, 1954-1 Cum. Buu.m 17.
92The validity of provisions against assignments in group life policies has
been upheld. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 300 S.W. 599 (Ky. 1927).
93 See, e.g., Frey v. Feller, 127 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct 1953), holding
that an irrevocable beneficiary designation did not survive the one year term
in which it was made where there was a substitution of new group policies
and new insurers.94 In re Johnson's Estate, 208 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Sup. Ct 1925) ; see Garner
v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 110 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E. 130 (1888).
95 Commissioner v. Estate of Strauss, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 853 (1950) (New York Stock Exchange death gratuity held inclu-
dible since insured could terminate benefit under the fund by selling his seat).
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convert the policy in the event of such termination. If
assignment is impossible, the conversion privilege may be
irrevocably waived by an instrument signed by the employer,
insurer and insured.
Pension and Proft Sharing Plan
A qualified pension or profit sharing plan may be used
to incorporate the advantages of group life insurance and
has additional tax advantages. There are, of course, a
variety of ways for funding such plans. Life insurance is
used either alone or in conjunction with other types of
investment to provide funds for the employer to pay the
employee upon the latter's death or retirement. The tax
advantages of the qualified plan are well known. The
employer's contributions are deductible to the employer,96
and are not income to the employee." Death benefits attri-
butable to the employer's contributions are not subject to
estate tax.98 If the employee receives a lump sum settle-
ment, he is entitled to long-term capital gains treatment. 9
If benefits are paid to the employee upon retirement in the
form of an annuity, the favorable tax rules of section 72
for the taxation of annuities are applicable. Since a qualified
pension or profit sharing plan is itself a tax-exempt organ-
ization, accretions to the fund are tax-free.
A variety of methods are available to fund a pension
or profit sharing plan through life insurance. :Retirement
income policies are used in a fully insured plan. Such
policies provide death benefits in the event the insured fails
to live to retirement. A combination plan makes use of
ordinary life insurance policies convertible upon retirement.
In such a plan, part of each annual employer contribution
is used to pay the life insurance premium, and the balance
is placed in trust, or left with the life insurance company
under a deposit administration agreement. If the insured
dies prior to retirement, his beneficiary receives the proceeds
of the ordinary life policy. If he lives to retirement, the
cash value of the policy plus amounts from the trust or
96 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404.
97 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 403.
98 INT. Rgv. CODE OF 1954, §2039(c).9 9 INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 403(a) (2).
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deposit administration fund provide the corpus for his
retirement benefits.
In a profit sharing plan, as much as 30 per cent of the
aggregate contributions may be invested in life insurance.
In some plans such an investment is required; in others, the
participant is given a choice to place a portion of his funds
in either life insurance or other investments. Since the
investments of a qualified pension or profit sharing plan in
life insurance will qualify for purposes of bond investment,
other trust assets will be freed for equity investments.
Yon-qualified Plans
Group life insurance and pension and profit sharing
plans require a wide participation of all, or nearly all,
employees. While Father will profit from participation in
these plans, the planner may desire to use one of several
alternative plans which do not require such wide participa-
tion. Non-qualified pension plans, split-dollar insurance,
minimum deposit insurance, and deferred compensation con-
tracts are all available for the further development of the
client's estate plan.
Under a non-qualified pension or profit sharing plan,
contributions of the employer are income to the employee 00
and are deductible by the employer 'o if the employee's rights
in the plan are nonforfeitable. If his rights are forfeitable
at the time of contribution, the contributions are neither
deductible by the employer I02 nor are they income to the
employee.30
3
100 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 403 (c) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.403 (c) -1 (a).
'
01 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404(a) (5). The deduction is available (1)
in the tax year that it is paid, (2) to the extent allowed for pension plans,
generally, and (3) if the employees' rights arising from the contribution are
nonforfeitable when the contribution is paid.
102River Fuel Corp. v. Kohler, 266 F.2d 190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 827 (1959) (no deduction where employee received only his contribu-
tions on severance of employment or withdrawal from plan); Wesley Heat
Treating Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1959); Russell Mfg.
Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (deduction denied for
amount contributed, but allowed for amount paid employee where employee's
rights vested at time of contribution, but were lost if employee left company
before a certain date). But see Rev. Rul. 59-383, 1959-2 Cum. BUL. 456
(the Internal Revenue Service will not follow Russell Mfg. Co.).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.403 (a)-1 (b). If rights subsequently become nonforfeit-
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Whether the death benefits under a non-qualified plan
are subject to the federal estate tax depends upon the
applicability of several different sections of the estate tax
law to the terms of the plan.
a. Section 2033
Avoidance of section 2033 is obtained by making sure
that the decedent has no "interest in property" at death.
The line drawn between situations where the decedent has
the unilateral power to designate the beneficiary at his
death "4 and where such a designation can only be exercised
in conjunction with another 5 is much too tenuous a distinc-
tion for planning. A better approach is to make sure that
the decedent has no power at all to change the designation
of the beneficiary.
b. Section 2039
Making the beneficiary designation irrevocable would
not necessarily remove death benefits under a non-qualified
plan from the sweep of section 2039. The test of includibility
under this section is whether the decedent's rights to the
death benefits are forfeitable.0
Section 2039(a) provides that the gross estate shall
include "the value of an annuity or other payment" receiv-
able by a beneficiary
if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment
was payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to
receive such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with
another for his life or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death.
able, the employee includes in his gross income the value of the contract
attributable to the contribution in the year that the change occurs. Treas.
Reg. § 1.403(d)-1. Such amount goes to increase his investment in the con-
tract. INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, §403(b) (6).
104 G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 Cum. Buu. 160.
105 Estate of Edward H. Wadewitz, 39 T.C. 925 (1963), affd ots another
issue, 339 F.2d 980 (7th Cir. 1964).106 Ibid.
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In BaheWs Estate,' the Court of Olaims considered an
unqualified pension plan of the Chesapeake and Ohio Rail-
road. By the terms of the plan, the employee was entitled
to (1) deferred compensation, whereby he or his beneficiary
would receive a certain amount either before or after retire-
ment, and (2) a death benefit, whereby the decedent's bene-
ficiary would receive a continuation of salary.
The decedent died prior to reaching retirement, and the
employer paid his widow $100,000 in sixty equal monthly
installments under the deferred compensation plan, and a
sum equal to three-months salary as a death benefit. The
Court of Claims first ruled that the value of the right to
$100,000 was includible:
1. The plan under which the payment was made, though
adopted unilaterally by the company, was a "contract or
agreement" within the meaning of the statute.
2. The payments received by the widow were an "an-
nuity or other payment."
3. The decedent "possessed the right to receive an
annuity or other payment."
4. While the amounts were not payable to the decedent
at death, he did possess the "right to receive," and this
includes his interest in future contingent benefits.
5. He possessed this right to receive for a period that
did not end before his death.
6. The employer's contributions are attributed to the
decedent by virtue of the statute.
7. The statute is not confined to the situation where
the decedent is receiving the benefit of a survivorship annuity
at the time of his death.
S. The construction adopted by the court is in harmony
with the basic concepts of the estate tax.
While the court was unable to find that the payments
under the death benefit plan fell within the language "an-
1o0 Bahen's Estate v. United States, 305 F2d 827 (Ct. C1. 1962).
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nuity or other payment," the payments were includible in
the decedent's gross estate since the court felt that the
Regulations required that the "plans of the C. & ... .. be
deemed a coordinated whole for the purposes of section
2039.1,108
That death benefits must be considered as part of the
overall plan for employees was re-emphasized in another
recent case involving an unqualified plan for some executives
of Standard Oil Company of New Jersey."0 9  The plan was
unfunded and provided for twelve equal payments to certain
surviving dependents of the decedent equal to twelve times the
monthly retirement allowance payable to a retired employee
under the company's annuity plan. The annuitant had no
power to designate the beneficiary, but he could exclude any
person from the stated classes of eligible beneficiaries.
The district court held that the payments were "insurance"
specifically excluded by the language of section 2039. They
were not includible under section 2042 since the decedent
possessed no incidents of ownership. Nor were they includ-
ible under sections 2035 through 2038 since they did not
consist of any property with reference to which the decedent
had made a transfer. Finally, they were not includible
under section 2033 or 2041 since the decedent had no
interest in the payments at his death.
On appeal by the Government, the second circuit re-
versed 0  and held that, considering the annuity plan and
the death benefit plan together, the payments under the
latter were not insurance.
Whether qualified or not, all pension plans will have
a variety of benefits for employees. One benefit will be a
death payment to the employee's beneficiary in the event
of his death prior to retirement. If he lives until retirement,
he will receive an annuity, taxable to him under section 72
during the retirement period. At his death, his beneficiary
will receive a death benefit, such as in McCobb, a survivorship
:o8 Id. at 835.
:o9 McCobb v. All, 206 F. Supp. 901 (D. Conn. 1962).
110 All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1963). The holding of the Court
of Appeals was in accord with the Commissioner's Regulations under Section
2039. Treas. Reg, § 20.2039-1(b) (2), Example (6).
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annuity. In either event, whether the death benefit arises
before or after retirement, it will be included under section
2039. The one possible exception, according to Wadewitz,
is where the decedent's rights are forfeitable.
A wiser approach is to qualify the plan so that all
benefits attributable to the employer's contributions will be
expressly exempt from the estate tax.
Split Dollar and Minimum Deposit Insurance
In recent years, two plan4 for the purchase of life insur-
ance with a minimum expense to the employee have become
increasingly popular. The first is "split dollar" insurance.
The employer pays a portion of the life insurance premium
on the life of the employee."' Such payments may be
viewed either as loans from the employer or as payments of
additional compensation. In 1955, the Commissioner took
the former view,"2 but in 1964, he revoked this ruling, and
held that the employee must include as income the value of
any insurance protection provided by his employer in excess
of the portions allocable to premiums paid by him."' There
would be no corresponding deduction for the employer." 4
Minimum deposit life insurance operates in much the
same way as split dollar, with the exception that the insurer,
bank or other lender, advances the sums to pay the excess
portion of the premiums. Such loans are interest bearing
and, if bona fide, the interest would be deductible by the
employee." 5
The addition of section 264(c) to the Code in 1964 has
made minimum deposit insurance much less attractive. This
section requires the insured to pay the full amount of the
premiums for the first four years of a contract if the amount
"'1 The employer pays an amount equal to the annual increase in cash value
each year, and the employee pays the balance. On death of the employee, the
employer recovers amounts advanced by him, and the employee receives the
balance of proceeds.
112 Rev. Rul. 55-713, 1955-2 Cum. BuLLT 23.
13 Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 Cum. BuLi. 11. The rule applies to all policies
brought under such an arrangement after November 13, 1964.
11 Ibid.
"2 Cf. Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960).
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of interest that would otherwise be deductible exceeds one
hundred dollars per year.
INTEGRATING LiFn INSuRANCE INTO TM CLINT'S
OVERALL ESTATE PLAN
Planning of the life insurance program within every
estate plan must be carefully coordinated with the overall
estate objectives of the client. We have seen how the client
may use life insurance to provide the necessary liquidity for
the payment of taxes and other claims against the estate;
how he may use life insurance, along with buy-sell, as a
means to control the size of his estate; and how life insur-
ance plans are developed in conjunction with the client's
status as an employee.
Different approaches are used with different clients,
depending upon the size of their estates and their objectives.
The net cost of these varying approaches must be determined
and compared. Ultimately, the planner produces an optimum
life insurance program for the client.
The final step is the integration of this insurance plan
into the client's total estate plan. This, of course, is beyond
the scope of this article.
The possibilities for the development of flexible estate
plans using life insurance as a primary ingredient are un-
limited. We have suggested a few that have posed interest-
ing problems in the programming of typical estates. As
the years go by, new problems will arise and new solutions
will be developed. But whatever the future holds, life insur-
ance will always play an important, if not dominant, role
in nearly every estate plan.
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